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ABSTRACT  Over the last two decades an economic reform paradigm has 
dominated social security and health research: economic reform policies 
have defined its parameters, established its premises, generated its questions 
and even furnished its answers. This paradigm has been particularly 
influential in accounts of the early 1980s collapse of China’s rural 
cooperative medical system (CMS), which is depicted almost exclusively as 
the outcome of the post-Mao economic policies that decollectivized 
agriculture. This paper draws primarily on government documents and 
newspaper reports from the late 1970s and early 1980s to argue that CMS 
collapse is better explained by a change in health policy. It shows that this 
policy change was in turn shaped both by post-Mao elite politics and by 
CMS institutions dating back to the late 1960s. The paper concludes by 
discussing how an explanation of CMS collapse that is centred on health 
policy and politics reveals the limitations of the economic reform paradigm 
and contributes to a fuller understanding of the post-Mao period. 
 
Over the last two decades, an economic reform paradigm has dominated research on 
social security and health in China.1 The ‘economic reform period’ has become the 
standard time frame for investigation, and economic policies adopted since the December 
1978 Third Plenum are the common premise of inquiry. 2 Core questions revolve around 
                                                 
1
 I use the term ‘paradigm’ here in the Kuhnian sense, as defining the parameters of enquiry and establishing 
its central premises and questions, but I do not claim, as Kuhn does for the natural sciences, that the 
economic reform paradigm encompasses scientific laws and particular research methods or techniques. See  
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996 (1962)). 
2
 The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 11th Central Committee is conventionally taken as 
having initiated the economic reforms. 
2 
the outcomes of these economic policies, which have also sometimes been seen as 
determinants of social change and systemic pressures to which social policies must adapt. 
They are, for example, said to have led to rising poverty and inequality, and so to changes 
in urban poverty relief programmes, while state enterprise reforms have resulted in new 
pension policies.3 Similarly, enterprise restructuring and the problems created ‘as China’s 
economy took a market-oriented direction’4 are argued to have led to 1990s urban health 
insurance reforms. 5  In the same vein, the economic policies that decollectivized 
agriculture and introduced household farming are conventionally argued to have caused 
the early 1980s collapse of the rural cooperative medical system (hezuo yiliao zhidu 合作
医疗制度, hereafter CMS).6  
 
There are good reasons for the emergence and persistence of the economic reform 
paradigm. First, the Chinese government itself has put economic growth-oriented policies 
at the centre of its development strategy since 1978 and presents them as inevitable.7 
Second, studies of social security and health policies have often focussed on finance, 
which may have oriented them toward economic matters. Third, researchers often have 
                                                 
3
 Joe C.B. Leung, 'Dismantling the 'Iron Rice Bowl': Welfare Reforms in the People's Republic of China', 
Journal of Social Policy 23 (3) (1994): pp. 341-361; Nelson Chow, and Yuebin Xu, 'Pension reform in 
China', in Social Policy Reform in China, edited by C. Jones Finer. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).  
4
 Chack-kie Wong, Vai Io Lo, and Kwong-leung Tang, China's Urban Health Care Reform: From State 
Protection to Individual Responsibility. (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006). For a similar argument see 
Therese Hesketh, and Wei Xing Zhu, 'Health in China: The Health Care Market', British Medical Journal 
314 (1997): pp. 1616-1618. 
5
 Colleen M. Grogan, 'Urban Economic Reform and Access to Health Care Coverage in the People's 
Republic of China', Social Science and Medicine 41 (8) (1995): pp. 1073-1084,  
X.Y.  Gu, and S.L. Tang, 'Reform of the Chinese Health Care Financing System', Health Policy 32 (1995): 
pp. 181-191; L. S Ho, 'Market reforms and China's health care system.' Social Science and Medicine 41 (8) 
(1995): pp. 1065-72. 
6
 See for example Xue-Shan Feng, Sheng-lan Tang, Gerald Bloom, Malcolm Segall, and Xingyuan Gu, 
'Cooperative medical schemes in contemporary rural China', Social Science and Medicine 41 (8) (1995): pp. 
1111-1118; Sheila Hillier, and Shen Jie, 'Health care systems in transition: People's Republic of China. Part 
1: An overview of China's health care system', Journal of Public Health Medicine 18 (3) (1996): pp. 
258-265; Xuegai Kan, 'Village health workers in China: reappraising the current situation', Health Policy 
and Planning 5 (1) (1990): pp. 40-48; David Blumenthal, and William C. Hsiao, 'Privatization and Its 
Discontents: The Evolving Chinese Health Care System', New England Journal of Medicine 353 (11) 
(2005): pp. 1165-1169. 
7
 Official policy has since at least 1992 taken the position that people who resist reform–whether officials or 
disgruntled workers for example–are simply conservatives who ‘need to change their thinking’. 
3 
been concerned with influencing policies rather than explaining them. This is particularly 
true of Chinese social scientists for whom probing too deeply the reasons for change 
might be politically risky. Fourth, the economic reform paradigm has been influential in 
part because political scientists have paid little attention to social security and health 
policy.8 Finally, and most importantly, the impact of economic reform policies on China’s 
social security and health systems has been enormous. 
 
While acknowledging the significant impact of economic policies, this paper challenges 
the economic reform paradigm. It does so by showing that health policy (including 
pre-reform policy) and politics mattered just as much as economic policy in the early 
1980s collapse of CMS. Using State Council and Ministry of Health documents and 
Chinese newspaper reports, the paper argues that CMS collapse was not simply a 
consequence of economic decollectivization after 1978. 9 In fact it was more precisely the 
result of a 1981 reversal in Ministry of Health policy. That reversal, like the economic 
reforms themselves, was in turn the product of elite leadership and ideological changes in 
the late 1970s. After the pre-Cultural Revolution Minister of Health was rehabilitated, 
CMS became labelled a Cultural Revolution policy and was abandoned. But while 
post-Mao politics created a critical juncture for CMS, the seeds of its demise can be traced 
back to 1960s policies that established its core institutions.10 Those CMS institutions 
failed to create strong stakeholders into the 1980s: the programme was locally funded and 
thus underfinanced, often delivered poor quality health services, and did not put 
significant resources under the control of the health bureaucracy. 11  Other potential 
                                                 
8Exceptions include Tony Saich, Providing Public Goods in Transitional China. (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); Gordon White, 'Social security reforms in China: towards an East Asian model?' in The 
East Asian Welfare Model, edited by R. Goodman, G. White and H.-J. Kwon. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998); Mark L. Frazier, Socialist Insecurity: Pensions and the Politics of Uneven Development 
in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2010); Dorothy J. Solinger, 'Path Dependency 
Reexamined: Chinese Welfare Policy in the Transition to Unemployment', Comparative Politics 38 (1) 
(2005): pp. 83-101. 
9
 Although I have interviewed both national and local Chinese health researchers and officials, I have found 
none involved in late 1970s and early 1980s health reform initiatives (now thirty years ago) and able to 
comment authoritatively on them. 
10
 My analysis here has been influenced by other institutionalist work, notably that of Paul Pierson on policy 
feedback. See Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of 
Retrenchment. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
11
 My argument here is congruent with that of Linda Cook, who has shown bureaucratic stakeholders to be 
4 
stakeholders, such as the local officials charged with running CMS, barefoot doctors who 
supplied the basic health services, and the farmers who received those services, were 
either unwilling or unable to defend it. 12 
 
The next section introduces CMS, its Maoist and Cultural Revolution ties, and its 
institutional design, before setting out conventional explanations of its collapse. The paper 
then examines the Ministry’s CMS policy reversal from the late 1970s into the early 1980s 
and shows how elite politics and institutional design contributed to that reversal. It then 
considers why there was not greater opposition to the collapse of CMS from China’s 
barefoot doctors and farmers. In conclusion, the paper reflects on how attention to health 
policy and politics enhances our understanding of the wider post-Mao reforms and remind 
us that economic policies are themselves politically-driven. Finally, it sets out the reasons 
why political scientists should pay greater attention to Chinese social and health policy.  
 
The Cooperative Medical System 
A Maoist Initiative 
CMS is the name given to the totality of locally-organized and funded rural health 
schemes that operated across China from the mid-1950s. 13 CMS was closely associated 
with Mao Zedong, and was promoted during periods when he was most influential: the 
mid-late 1950s and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.14 Although it had collapsed in the 
economic and social disaster that followed the Great Leap Forward,15 in 1965 CMS was 
                                                                                                                                                
important to the fate of welfare and health in European authoritarian post-communist states. See  
Linda J. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007). 
12
 In contrast, urban health insurance protections were better defended because they had a credible funding 
source—enterprises—and therefore brought resources to the bureaucratic stakeholders (local Labour and 
Social Security bureaux) in control of them. They were also untainted by Cultural Revolution associations, 
had been longer established, and provided access to better quality health care. See Jane Duckett, The 
Chinese State's Retreat from Health: Policy and the Politics of Retrenchment. (London and New York: 
Routledge, forthcoming). 
13It did have antecedents in the 1940s CCP-controlled areas. See Jun Han, and Dan Luo, Zhongguo nongcun 
weisheng diaocha (China rural health survey) (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe, 2007). 
14
 Xinzhong Qian, Zhongguo weisheng shiye fazhan yu juece (Development and Decisions in China's 
Health Work). (Beijing: Zhongguo yiyao keji chubanshe, 1992).  
15
 David Lampton, The Politics of Medicine in China: The Policy Process, 1949-77 (Boulder: Westview 
press, 1977). 
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reported in counties across more than ten provinces.16 From summer 1968 it became a 
central feature of national health policy and, alongside barefoot doctors, part of a high 
profile Cultural Revolution initiative to improve rural health services.17 At this time CMS 
was promoted using Maoist class rhetoric and in line with Mao’s 1965 criticism of the 
Ministry of Health for urban bias and elitism. 
 
Institutional Design 
Although CMS was an important part of national health policy in the late 1960s and 
1970s, it was organized and delivered locally through sub-county communes and 
production brigades. The communes, brigades and their members contributed to the 
schemes, which then paid for some medical treatment and medicines. According to the 
Ministry of Health, the system worked as follows:  
 
Commune and brigade public welfare funds (gongyijin 公益金 ) and 
commune members each contributed to cooperative medical [system] funds 
(hezuo yiliao jingfei 合作医疗经费), collecting contributions of on average 
about 1.5 to three yuan per person once each year. When people then went to 
the health clinic (yiliao zhan 医疗站) for treatment the fee was reduced or 
exempted (jianmian减免). The methods for reducing or exempting fees were 
manifold: sometimes patients paid the treatment fee but did not pay for 
medicine; sometimes their treatment and medicine costs were reduced or 
exempted; [and] some paid for medicine but not for such things as 
registration fees, injections and acupuncture.18 
 
The CMS schemes were usually organized by the production brigades, who pooled 
contributions from their constituent production teams. Sometimes groups of contiguous 
brigades pooled funds on a slightly larger scale, and in some localities communes pooled 
funds across the brigades within them, but the schemes were always in the hands of 
sub-county collectives.19 Barefoot doctors, who delivered health services through brigade 
                                                 
16
 Qian, Zhongguo weisheng shiye fazhan yu juece (Development and Decisions in China's Health Work).  
17
 Feng, Tang, Bloom, Segall, and Gu, 'Cooperative medical schemes in contemporary rural China'; Kan, 
'Village health workers in China: reappraising the current situation'. 
18
 Ministry of Health, ed. Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1983 (China health yearbook 1983) (Beijing: 
Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1983), p. 206. 
19
 Lampton, The Politics of Medicine in China: The Policy Process, 1949-77.  
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clinics, were paramedics also expected to do agricultural work and paid in work points, 
the standard commune system of remuneration. Rural dwellers usually sought treatment at 
the brigade clinic, but depending on the generosity of their local scheme, might also attend 
their commune health centre or county hospital. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution CMS was strongly promoted as an initiative to ‘guarantee’ 
poor rural dwellers access to health care and medicines.20 It helped them pay for treatment 
and medicines and reduced their direct ‘out-of-pocket’ payments.21 But because it was 
funded at the sub-county level, it was very often under-resourced. County government 
budgetary subsidies, which differed substantially from locality to locality, provided 
mainly for preventive programmes (vaccines, contraception, and health campaign 
materials), training doctors, and paying county health workers’ salaries and medical 
equipment. 22  CMS schemes therefore funded medicines and curative care provided 
through the brigade clinics and commune health centres. Given the widespread rural 
poverty in the 1970s, however, finance in most localities was extremely limited. This 
meant that CMS provided only very basic health care and relied heavily on locally-grown 
herbal medicines. Local schemes were often bankrupted or suspended, particularly when 
harvests were poor.23 Accounts of problems, particularly with shortages of finance, were 
common even when they were being promoted most heavily, during the late 1960s.24  
 
Decollectivization Policy and its Impact on CMS 
Although information on the prevalence of CMS schemes across China in the 1960s and 
1970s is patchy, they seem to have been at their most extensive in the late 1970s, and they 
                                                 
20
 See for example, 'Fully accept the cooperative medical system welcomed by poor, lower and middle 
peasants', Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 5 December 1968, 1.  
21
 It did not eliminate out-of-pocket payments. There are no reliable data for the 1970s, but data for 1980, 
when CMS was still relatively widespread, show patient fees to be 23% of total health spending. See Shaikh 
I. Hossain, 'Tackling Health Transition in China' (Washington: World Bank, 1997). 
22
 Asian Development Bank, People’s Republic of China: Toward Establishing and Rural Health 
Protection System. (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002). 
23
 David Lampton, 'The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality in Education and Health Services in China', 
American Political Science Review 73 (1979). 
24See for example, 'Huangcun, liangxiang gongshe dui leyuan gongshe shixing hezuo yiliao zhidu de yijian 
(The opinions of Huang village, Liang Commune, on Leyuan Commune’s implementation of the 
Cooperative Medical System)', Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 5 December 1968, 1. 
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were abandoned mainly between 1982 and 1984.25 While reliable accounts of the numbers 
of people participating in CMS during this period are unavailable, numerous accounts 
from within and outside China indicate that by 1984 around only five per cent of villages 
had CMS, a dramatic fall from the much more widespread provision in the late 1970s.26 
 
Where CMS schemes ceased operating in the early 1980s, some localities—encouraged 
by the Ministry of Health—experimented with ‘medical treatment contracts’ (yiliao 
chengbao hetong 医疗承包合同).27 But in other areas health service providers often 
simply charged fees that villagers had to pay for directly out of their own pockets. This 
removal of health risk protection was explained away with remarkable sanguinity in the 
official Party newspaper People’s Daily in 1981:  
 
To suit rural economic system reform, the rural health system currently is 
also undergoing some changes. In some localities where the economic 
conditions are a little lacking and the brigade runs a health clinic, they are 
implementing [a system in which] those who seek medical treatment pay the 
money [shui kan bing shui jiao qian 谁看病谁交钱].28 
 
Official explanations like this, which portray health system changes as a consequence or 
requirement of economic reform, have been taken up by others within and outside China. 
Some for example have argued that the ‘socio-economic base of the cooperative medical 
scheme was initially the agricultural collective. When this was transformed into the 
household responsibility system at the end of the 1970s, most of the cooperative medical 
                                                 
25
 Qian, Zhongguo weisheng shiye fazhan yu juece (Development and Decisions in China's Health Work).  
The total amount of rural collective health fund spending halved between 1982 and 1983, from just over two 
billion yuan to just over one billion. See Hossain, 'Tackling Health Transition in China'. 
26
 It is not unusual to see estimates of around 90 per cent of villages in China with CMS schemes in the 
1970s, but David Lampton has shown pattern of CMS implementation to be have varied enormously that 
decade. See Lampton, 'The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality in Education and Health Services in China',  
pp. 459-77. CMS participation rates remained low after 1984 until a ‘new’ rural CMS was promoted from 
2005. 
27
 Ministry of Health, ed. Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1983 (China health yearbook 1983).  
28
 Zhenpeng Xu, and Bingguang Chen. 1981. 'Jiaqiang hezuo yiliao caiwu guanli de changshi (Strengthen 
attempts to manage cooperative medicine financial affairs)', Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 17 February 
1981. 
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schemes collapsed’.29 More recently, others have stated that ‘the government suddenly 
and completely dismantled communes to privatize [sic] the agricultural economy. A side 
effect was to rip apart the health care safety net for most of rural China’,30 and that ‘the 
abolition of collective farming and communes after 1982 resulted in the collapse of the 
cooperative medical system’.31 Studies that go into a little more detail tend to argue that 
CMS collapsed primarily because decollectivization removed collective funding for it, 
though they do not elaborate on the mechanisms through which this happened. Although 
some do mention other factors, including weakened administrative capacity32, ‘financial, 
political and managerial problems’33, and the ‘problem of ideology’34, they are not fully 
explored.  
 
It is understandable that post-Mao economic policy has been seized on as the main 
explanatory factor in CMS’s collapse. Not only has the economic reform paradigm 
established the parameters and premises of the field, but the 1982-4 collapse is 
contemporaneous with the widespread introduction of household farming and the 
dismantling of the communes through which collective farming had been organized.35 
Moreover, decollectivization did remove sources of funding for CMS and incomes for 
barefoot doctors. Household farming meant farmers selling their produce directly to the 
state, and communes (now transformed into townships as set out in the 1982 State 
Constitution) and production brigades (now villages) no longer organized farming and 
controlled its revenues. The impact was three-fold. First, there was no longer significant 
agricultural income for commune (township) or brigade (village) collective funds that 
                                                 
29
 Gu, and Tang, 'Reform of the Chinese Health Care Financing System', p. 186. 
30
 Blumenthal, and Hsiao, 'Privatization and Its Discontents: The Evolving Chinese Health Care System',  p. 
1167. 
31
 Sukhan Jackson, Adrian C. Sleigh, Peng Li, and Xi-Li Liu, 'Health Finance in Rural Henan: Low 
Premium Insurance Compared to the Out-of-Pocket System', The China Quarterly 181 (March) (2005): pp. 
137-157. Quotation from p. 137. 
32
 Victor C.W. Wong, and Sammy W.S. Chiu, 'Health Care Reforms in the People's Republic of China: 
Strategies and social implications', Journal of Management in Medicine 12 (4/5) (1998): pp. 270-286. 
33
 Gu, and Tang, 'Reform of the Chinese Health Care Financing System', p. 186. 
34
 Xingzhu Liu, and Huajie Cao, 'China's Cooperative Medical System: Its Historical Transformations and 
the Trend of Development', Journal of Public Health Policy 13 (4) (1992): pp. 501-511. 505. 
35
 According to Carl Riskin, the household responsibility system was in place in most parts of the country 
between mid-1982 and 1983. Carl Riskin, China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 
1949. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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contributed to CMS. This was particularly important where the local economy was 
dominated by agriculture; the effects may have been mitigated in localities with 
collectively-owned industry. Second, although rural dwellers supposedly had made 
voluntary contributions to CMS under collectivization, in fact these ‘contributions’ were 
not paid out of their pockets, but were deducted from a production team’s income before 
the end of year allocation of that income to its members.36 The collective’s capacity to 
gather these contributions was therefore also weakened by household farming that put 
revenues directly in farmers’ pockets. Third, now that brigades and communes no longer 
managed production and its revenues, they abolished the work point system through 
which barefoot doctors had been paid to deliver health services, and this also effectively 
defunded CMS. 
 
But explaining CMS collapse as a simple by-product of decollectivization is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it depoliticizes a highly political issue: the 
withdrawal of an important programme of public provision aimed at guaranteeing access 
to health services. CMS collapse increased the vulnerability of the rural population to the 
financial costs of ill-health and thereby to impoverishment, and economic policy does not 
explain why alternative sources of funding were not found. While brigades and communes 
lost income because of decollectivization, farmers were now required to pay agricultural 
taxes. CMS could have been funded from the new county government tax revenues, 
perhaps alongside mandatory individual contributions. 
 
Second, decollectivization is not plausible as the main causal factor behind the collapse 
because CMS was a programme under the responsibility not of the Ministry of 
Agriculture but of the Ministry of Health. Under Chinese government norms CMS could 
not be abandoned nationally without Ministry of Health permission. China’s political 
system in the early 1980s remained tightly controlled, and local health officials would be 
unlikely to so quickly abandon a national programme without approval from higher 
levels. For this reason, if we are to understand the real causes of the collapse we must 
examine the Ministry of Health’s policy toward CMS.37  
                                                 
36
 Han, and Luo, Zhongguo nongcun weisheng diaocha (China rural health survey).  
37
 I do not intend to imply here that the Ministry of Health was a powerful one within central government. 
Indeed the discussion below will demonstrate how it was constrained by the wider central government 
commitment to economic growth and decollectivization. However, the Ministry still did have considerable 
influence over health policies, particularly those that were congruent with the post-Mao modernization 
10 
 
The Ministry of Health’s CMS Policy Reversal 
The Ministry of Health had been charged with establishing and overseeing CMS since 
before the Cultural Revolution, and in the early post-Mao period it restated its 
commitment to guaranteeing rural dwellers’ access to health care. From late 1979, 
however, it became more ambivalent and began to permit some localities to charge fees 
instead. Then in 1981 the Ministry completely reversed its initial post-Mao policy stance, 
labelling attempts to extend CMS a ‘leftist error’, and abandoning it. This shift from 
commitment to abandonment is set out in more detail below. 
 
Continued Commitment, 1977-1979 
In the immediate post-Mao period, the Ministry of Health retained its commitment to 
CMS. In 1977, it reaffirmed its pro-rural focus in health policy and announced plans to 
develop it. 38 CMS was even mentioned in the new 1978 State Constitution.39 And in 
March 1979, at a national meeting of health bureau leaders, the Ministry of Health 
defended CMS, reclaiming it as a 1950s initiative associated with the cooperativization of 
agriculture and the creation of the communes.40 Deng Xiaoping’s presence at this meeting 
seems to indicate that CMS retained support right at the apex of the new, reform-oriented 
party-state leadership.  
 
The Ministry’s commitment to CMS was apparently consolidated in December 1979 
when it promulgated jointly with several other government bodies a CMS ‘constitution’.41 
This document described CMS as a form of ‘welfare’ and an important part of health 
                                                                                                                                                
agenda and did not impinge on other ministries’ interests.  
38
 'Yingming lingxiu Hua zhuxi zhichu: zhunque de wanzheng de guanche zhixing Mao zhuxi geming 
weisheng luxian (Wise leader Chairman Hua points out: accurately and completely carry out the 
implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary health line', Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 20 August 
1977.   
39
 Han, and Luo, Zhongguo nongcun weisheng diaocha (China rural health survey),  
40
 See Xinzhong Qian, 'Woguo weisheng shiye shengli fazhan de huigu (A retrospective on the victorious 
development of health work in our country)', in Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1983 (China Health Yearbook 
1983), edited by Ministry of Health. (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1983).  
41
 Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, State Administration for Medicine 
Management, and the National Supply and Marketing Cooperative, ‘Nongcun hezuo yiliao gongcheng, 
shixing cao’an’ (Rural Cooperative Medicine Constitution, Draft Programme for Implementation), issued 
on 15 December 1979. 
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department work. It also stipulated that communes and brigades experiencing difficulties 
with their schemes should receive state assistance. And it made clear that CMS-funded 
village health services be provided though non-profit seeking clinics.42 That same month, 
Minister Qian Xinzhong put rural health work first on his list of priorities for 1980, 
reiterating its importance as ‘socialist welfare work’.43 He argued that mutual help should 
be preserved and said that CMS’s importance was in ‘guaranteeing 800 million rural 
dwellers’ access to health services and medicine’ (baozhang ba yi nongmin kanbing 
chiyao 保障八亿农民看病吃药). Thus he retained its Cultural Revolution goals, albeit 
stripped of the Maoist class rhetoric of ‘poor, lower and middle peasants’. 
 
Minister Qian’s December 1979 speech and the CMS constitution did, however, for the 
first time permit rural governments to implement schemes according to local 
circumstances. Most significantly, the Ministry here specifically allowed variation in the 
collection of cooperative funds and the proportions of medicine costs that could be 
reimbursed. Crucially, it also permitted patients to be charged wholesale prices where 
funds were temporarily insufficient to finance reimbursements or where CMS was not 
favoured locally.44 Although this fee charging would have been common practice, it 
appears to be the first time that the Ministry officially allowed it, and it marks a shift from 
the Cultural Revolution policy of insisting on nationwide implementation.  
 
Ambivalence, 1980 
In 1980 the Ministry of Health’s position on CMS became increasingly ambivalent. In a 
speech in January that year, Minister Qian, while noting its importance for rural dwellers’ 
health, again gave permission for local variation. Although he apparently anticipated 
CMS developing in line with the collective economy so that ‘the proportions of medical 
fees that are reimbursed should gradually be raised’45, he warned against prematurely 
                                                 
42
 Note, however, that the CMS constitution envisaged CMS developing along with the collective economy. 
Perhaps at this stage it was supported by pro-collective forces within the Ministry of Health against whom 
the tide was about to turn. 
43
 Xinzhong Qian, 'Zai quanguo weishengjuzhang huiyi shang de jianghua (zhaiyao) (Speech at a National 
Health Bureau Chief Meeting (extract))', 29 December 1979, in Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1983 (China 
health yearbook 1983), edited by Ministry of Health. (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1983). 
44
 Ibid., p. 33. 
45
 Xinzhong Qian, 'Zai quanguo weisheng juzhang huiyi shang de zongjie jianghua (zhaiyao) (Concluding 
speech at a National Health Bureau Chief Meeting (extract))', 5 January 1980, in Zhongguo weisheng 
nianjian 1983 (China health yearbook 1983), edited by Ministry of Health. (Beijing: Renmin weisheng 
12 
reimbursing too high a proportion of farmers’ medical costs for fear of bankrupting the 
schemes. And he also noted CMS should not increase the economic burden on farmers, an 
important issue at the time because it had led rural dwellers to protest in Beijing.46 
 
Through the year, the Ministry’s calls for taking into account local economic conditions 
became more prominent. In March 1980, Minister Qian, while still making CMS a 
priority, encouraged flexibility based on local conditions when deciding on methods for 
gathering funds and the proportions of medical expenses to be reimbursed. He also 
stressed the need for health work to serve national modernization.47 By May, People’s 
Daily was arguing that some localities had encountered problems with CMS because they 
had not ‘set out from economic conditions’.48 
 
Abandonment, 1981 
The year 1981 was the watershed for CMS as the Ministry of Health linked it to Cultural 
Revolution leftism and abandoned it. In January 1981, the Ministry began by further 
reducing its commitment. It emphasized funding, the delivery of health services and the 
availability of doctors rather than the access to services that CMS afforded villagers. At 
the national health bureau leaders’ meeting that month, Qian gave two speeches. In the 
first, he repeated that localities could temporarily suspend CMS and charge fees for 
medical treatment, but he did not mention the need to charge wholesale prices. He also 
indicated that priority should be given to ensuring that ‘production brigades have doctors, 
medicine and health service providers, and people responsible for preventive health 
construction and birth planning work’, arguing that barefoot doctors were crucial to 
CMS.49  
 
                                                                                                                                                
chubanshe, 1983). 
46
 Thomas P. Bernstein, and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
47
 'Weisheng gongzuo yao geng hao de wei sihua fuwu (Health work must better serve the four 
modernizations)', Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 7 March 1980. 
48
 Haolin Du, 'Nongcun hezuo yiliao zhidu de gaige (Rural cooperative medical system reform)', in 
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But in his closing speech to the January 1981 meeting, Qian went further. He stated that it 
was a ‘leftist error to stress raising the reimbursable proportions and scope of CMS 
without considering the objective economic situation and the masses’ wishes’.50 This 
marked a reversal and a clear attempt to associate CMS with the Cultural Revolution.51 
Subsequent accounts of the January 1981 health meeting indicate that it had taken a 
decisive turn away from core Cultural Revolution policies on health, including CMS. 
Reportedly, the meeting was critical of ‘the mistaken view, influenced by leftist thinking’ 
that ‘health work is social welfare work, that if there is more and more state protection, 
more and more free preventive care, and fees for treatment and medicine prices are 
continually lowered, that then this will embody the superiority of socialism’.52 This is a 
clear reversal of the position taken by the Ministry less than two years earlier in March 
1979 when Qian had stated that: ‘our country’s medical and health work is social welfare 
work’.53 From late January 1981 onwards, CMS is rarely mentioned in Ministry of Health 
policy statements and work reports.54 Instead, the Ministry moved to supporting contracts 
between barefoot doctors and local collectives (whether communes, brigades, or 
‘organizations of rural dwellers’), and permitted private out-of-pocket payments (zifei 
yiliao自费医疗 or kan bing shou fei 看病收费). 55  
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The central policy shift was soon picked up in the localities. Many began experimenting 
with contracts in health in the early 1980s, perhaps as early as 1981 and certainly by 1983, 
while in other areas there was a direct shift to villagers paying for their medical costs 
out-of-pocket.56 And the widespread local response reflects local government officials’ 
sensitivity to political changes at the centre in the early 1980s. Previous swings in 
ideology and the political purges that had often accompanied them since the founding of 
the People’s Republic in 1949 meant that local leaders by the 1980s are likely to have felt 
that they needed to demonstrate they were not themselves ‘leftists’. Once it was clear that 
the Cultural Revolution was to be thoroughly repudiated, and once CMS was associated 
with that period, local leaders were often afraid to defend it.57 Given the problems there 
had evidently been with the long underfunded schemes in many localities and the further 
decline in cooperative funds with the switch from collective to household farming, it is not 
surprising that local government officials abandoned programmes. Indeed officials in 
localities that had not abandoned CMS reported in the early 1980s that they were afraid 
that they would be punished.58 
 
Elite Politics and Ministry of Health Priorities 
What, though, explains the Ministry of Health’s change in policy? First, it was influenced 
by leadership appointments as Deng Xiaoping began to emerge as China’s pre-eminent 
leader in the late 1970s. Central and local leaders who had been criticized and removed 
from governmental posts in the Cultural Revolution were reinstated, and they included 
Qian Xinzhong, purged from his post as Minister of Health in June 1968 and again made 
Minister in March 1979. Ji Zongquan, another key reformer who worked closely with 
Qian, was made Vice-Minister in February the same year.59 Both leaders, but especially 
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Qian, who was trained in medicine, are associated with a range of post-Mao policies to 
extend ‘socialist modernization’—the stated goal of the Dengist reformers—to health. At 
the same time, the Ministry of Health benefitted from the reform strategy’s focus on 
science and technology, one of the ‘four modernizations’ and something the new Ministry 
leadership was keen to develop.60 It also it benefitted from the reformers’ support for 
expertise and training that had been opposed during the Cultural Revolution when 
educated ‘intellectuals’, including medical professionals, were vilified.61  
 
Second, as Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power there was an ideological swing against 
egalitarian ‘leftism’ as the reformers engaged in a vituperative criticism of the Cultural 
Revolution, its leaders and its policies.62 It was in this context that CMS, a prominent 
Maoist initiative from 1968, was labelled a ‘leftist product’, became ‘thoroughly 
discredited’, and had to be ‘reformed out’ (gaigediao 改革掉).63 The timing of the 
Ministry’s abandonment of CMS, in early-mid 1981, corresponds to the events that year 
that saw the Cultural Revolution formally repudiated by the CCP leadership in its June 
1981 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party’.64 
 
But resources were also an important factor. Crucially, the Ministry of Health did not have 
a real stake in CMS because it did not bring the Ministry or its subordinate health 
departments control over a significant budget item. CMS institutions from at least the late 
1960s (and probably earlier) gave control over funds to production brigades rather than to 
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county (or higher level) health departments. And because schemes were only financed by 
brigades and communes, they were usually under-resourced. Thus when agricultural 
decollectivization removed local collective funding for CMS, it impacted only indirectly 
on health departments’ resources by reducing income to the brigade clinics they oversaw. 
In any case the Ministry was able to turn to other mechanisms for funding the lowest tier 
or rural health service provision: in addition to supporting contracts between barefoot 
doctors and local collectives, and permitting out-of pocket payments, it also sought—and 
received—from the State Council permission for small scale private practice to 
‘supplement’ state and collective health service provision.65  This enabled doctors to 
practice medicine even where there was no CMS funding or collectively run clinic.66  
 
After the State Council granted permission for private practice, the Ministry of Health 
began to encourage it at the expense of CMS.67 By 1983, it was portraying CMS as simply 
a source of finance for rural health services alongside contracts and fee-for-service, and 
had dropped all references to guaranteeing rural dwellers’ access to doctors and 
medicine.68 The result was that by the 1983, 32 per cent of rural health service providers 
were small-scale private practices and by 1985 the proportion was 44 per cent.69 The 
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Ministry’s prioritization of financing services over guaranteeing farmers access to them 
reflects its long-established primary responsibility for health service providers. It also 
stems from its poor understanding of insurance and risk protection: discussion the 
Ministry’s abandonment of CMS in favour of private practice, former Minister Qian has 
said that ‘in retrospect health department leadership levels had had a rather vague 
understanding of the theory and practice of CMS’ in the early 1980s. 70  
 
Overall, then, without a direct stake in CMS, and with other funding mechanisms now 
possible, Ministry of Health leaders may have calculated that the programme was not 
worth defending, particularly given the underfunding and problems many localities had 
experienced even before decollectivization. Instead, the Ministry focussed on promoting 
private practice in particular,71 but also other policies, such as developing medical science 
and technology and improving medical professionals’ education, training and skills, that 
were more likely to win support and resources because they were congruent with the 
Dengist reformers’ wider modernization programme.72 
 
Absence of Opposition from Societal Interests 
But not only was there no bureaucratic stakeholder to defend CMS. In addition there 
appears to have been limited opposition to its collapse among societal stakeholders: the 
barefoot doctors who worked within the system and the rural dwellers protected—albeit 
patchily—by it. The barefoot doctor policy had been promoted alongside CMS during the 
Cultural Revolution and these rural paramedics were the key deliverers of rural 
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collectively funded health services. They may not, however, have been motivated to 
defend CMS. Centrally, this is because when CMS was abandoned they had other options. 
First, because they had been part-time practitioners who also worked in the fields in the 
1970s, they were able to easily return full-time to the now more lucrative agricultural 
work.73 Alternatively they could move into private practice: although the September 1980 
State Council approval for private medical practice stipulated that barefoot doctors should 
not usually practice privately, it gave permission for them to do so in poor areas.  
 
There also appears to have been little opposition to the collapse of CMS from among 
China’s rural dwellers, the main beneficiaries of the programme. One late 1970s account 
argued that it would be hard to take CMS away because farmers had become accustomed 
to having the curative care that it helped fund.74 But this anticipated opposition apparently 
did not materialize. Of course, farmers had few formal channels for expressing 
dissatisfaction with central policy to roll-back CMS. Notably, they were unable to form 
independent associations through which to collectively articulate their interests. But 
farmers did organize public protests over other issues in the early 1980s, and they 
apparently did not did not do so over CMS.75  
 
There are three key reasons for this absence of public protest. First, CMS often provided 
low quality medical care. A report in 1978 (when the programme was still officially in 
favour) noted for example that commune members who had made contributions to CMS 
schemes were sometimes unhappy with the quality of treatment they received.76 Second, 
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CMS may have become associated by villagers with the sometimes predatory and corrupt 
behaviour of local officials and the so-called ‘farmer’s burden’ created by many non-tax 
charges, some of them illegal, that officials levied on rural dwellers. Certainly, in the late 
1970s, accounts of the ‘peasant burden’ problem did mention CMS contributions.77 And 
the fact that the Ministry of Health at times felt it necessary to challenge such accounts 
indicates it was a significant problem.78 Finally, farmers, like officials, may have feared 
retribution for supporting leftist policies, and so may not have articulated their opposition 
to the collapse of CMS.79  
 
Conclusion  
Health policy and the politics surrounding it, including feedback from pre-reform policies, 
were central to the early 1980s collapse of CMS. This shows the limits of explanations 
based on post-1978 economic policy and thus of the economic reform paradigm in social 
security and health research. But this paper also shows that research on social security and 
health policy and politics can enhance our understanding of China’s post-Mao reforms. 
First, as we have seen, health policy was not simply reactive in the early post-Mao period; 
it also contributed to the reform project. Rehabilitated health officials were part of the 
reformist national leadership and they not only abandoned collectivist CMS and promoted 
pro-professional, scientific and technological modernization; they were also at the 
forefront of reform,80 adopting some health policies that preceded and may have paved the 
way for reformist economic policies. An example is the Ministry’s request for State 
Council approval of private medical practice in 1980. It followed very quickly on 1979 
CCP Central Committee and State Council permission for small-scale private economic 
activity (geti jingji 个体经济) in repairs and handicraft work,81 and it preceded the 1981 
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permission for urban small-scale private trade and commercial businesses (geti 
gongshanghu 个体工商户), the 1982 State Constitution’s inclusion of small-scale private 
economy, and 1984 permission for rural small-scale industrial and commercial 
businesses.82  
 
Second, health policy and the politics surrounding it also contribute to our understanding 
of some of the more fundamental political transformations of the post-Mao period. For 
example they show more clearly than economic policy the values and ideological 
underpinnings of the reformist strategy. That strategy, when seen simply as an economic 
one, may seem ‘pragmatic’ even though it values wealth creation over equity. It has 
certainly been portrayed that way by international scholars perhaps influenced by the fact 
that marketization was a move toward doing things ‘our way’. 83  But the Ministry of 
Health’s decision to abandon CMS84—and the fact that it was not blocked elsewhere in 
the central government—at a time when economic policies were beginning to produce 
(indeed encourage) income inequalities, reveals a clear rightward shift in political values 
and ideology. 85  It serves also to remind us that economic reform policies are not 
value-neutral or without ideological foundation. 
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Given their ability to shed light on these important ideological issues, it is surprising that 
the field of Chinese politics has neglected health and social policy. But political science 
research, too, has been preoccupied with economic reform and its consequences. It has 
focussed predominantly on outcomes such as the emergence of a middle class, the rise of 
the private sector and the development of civil society. And its core questions have 
centred on their implications for state-society relations and their potential to catalyze 
democratization. But the big political issues in China’s transformation – who gets what, 
when and how86 – are not only those that result from economic policy. As this study of 
CMS collapse has shown, social and health policies also have enormous redistributive 
consequences. In changing entitlements to state provision and reshaping or removing 
safety nets, they contribute to the wealth of some and may plunge others into poverty; and  
by significantly shifting the balance of state resources across the population, they create 
powerful new stakeholders and transform state-society relations in ways that tell us much 
about Chinese politics today and the forces likely to shape them in the future. 
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